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WHY GUNAJI V. MACIAS MATTERS TO CANDIDATES
AND VOTERS: ITS IMPACT ON NEW MEXICO
ELECTION LAW
OCEAN MUNDS-DRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Gunaji v. Macias,' the New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted Article Two,
Section Eight, of the New Mexico Constitution for the first time in an election
contest. 2 The court held that while the election was not "free and open," the proper
remedy was not to hold a new election, as the Contestants requested, but to reject
the votes in the precinct where the improper votes were cast. In order to reach this
decision, the court first addressed three preliminary issues: mootness, standing, and
source of remedy. The court held that although the case was moot, it was an issue
of substantial public interest and capable of repetition. The court also found that the
candidates had standing to assert the constitutional claim on behalf of voters. And
finally, because the court did not find a provision in the Election Code3 that
addressed the circumstances in this case, it held that it could fashion a remedy
outside of the statute.4
This note will examine the court's findings on mootness and standing, the court's
interpretation and holding of the "free and open" elections clause of the New
Mexico Constitution, the court's analysis of the power to fashion a remedy beyond
a statute and chosen remedy, the court's rationale, and the implications of this
decision on future New Mexico election contest cases.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the 1996 elections, the race for State Senate District No. 38 was between
Fernando R. Macias, Democrat, and Narendra N. Gunaji, Republican.5 The
candidates for Dofia Ana County Commission District No. 5 were Gilbert T.
Apodaca, Democrat, and Maria S. Sutton, Republican.
On Election Day, November 5, 1996, machine 4719 in Precinct 31 had two errors
on the ballot face. The early voters who used machine 4719 chose from Mary Jane
Garcia or Thomas Bulger for State Senate and Rita Torres (unopposed) for Dofia
Ana County Clerk.6
Sixty-six voters cast their votes using the incorrect ballot face on machine 4719
before the error was discovered. The sixty-sixth voter, after casting his vote, pointed
out the problem to precinct officials.7 Election officials then placed the correct ballot
* Class of 2004, University of New Mexico School of Law. My sincere gratitude to Professor Raquel
Montoya-Lewis, my faculty advisor, and Tad Lane, my manuscript editor.
1. 2001-NMSC-028, 31 P.3d 1008.
2. Id. 127, 31 P.3d at 1015.
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-1 (Michie 2002). A statute addressing the specific facts of the case has been
enacted since Gunaji, but at the time of the case, that statute was not yet law. See infra part mI.B.
4. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 31 P.3d 1008.
5. Unless otherwise indicated, all factual statements are from Gunaji.
6. The Appellant's Docketing Statement lists the candidate as James Parks, but the court's opinion lists the
name of Thomas Bulger. Appellant's Docketing Statement at 3, Gunaji (No. 25,896). The incorrect ballot face was
from a previous election. Id.
7. The sixty-sixth voter was a relative of candidate Gunaji. Id.
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face on the machine. However, election officials kept the machine in use and the
flawed ballots were mixed with the valid ballots that were cast with the correct
ballot face.
If one of the sixty-six voters who used the incorrect ballot voted for Mary Jane
Garcia for state senate, the vote was credited to Macias. If one voted for Thomas
Bulger, the vote was credited to Gunaji. The votes were likely credited this way due
to the similar positions on the ballot face in the previous election based on political
party. The final total in Precinct 31 for the senate race was 205 to 159 in favor of
Gunaji. The final results in District 38 were 5297 votes for Macias and 5286 votes
for Gunaji. This meant the state senate race was decided by only eleven votes.
Votes for Rita Torres were credited to Gilbert Apodaca. In the county commissioner race in Precinct 31, Apodaca had the most votes: 185 to 160. In total,
Apodaca had 4507 votes to Sutton's 4409 votes in District 5, a difference of 98
votes. Thus, the court stated that the sixty-six votes could have made a difference
in either election.'
Contestants Gunaji and Sutton brought this action on three counts.9 Count I was
an election contest, Count II was a request for declaratory judgment as to whether
the elections were valid, and Count I was a civil rights violation against the Dofia
Ana County Clerk. The county clerk had the action removed to federal court, where
the court dismissed Count I and remanded Counts I and II back to state district
court. 1°
The state district court found that-while the precinct board did not comply with
the Election Code, there was no fraud or intentional wrongdoing and no way to
determine who the sixty-six voters would have voted for."' Because the Contestants
could not obtain the relief they sought and discarding the votes from Precinct 31
would not change the election, the trial court granted the Contestees' Motion for
Summary Judgment on Count .2 The trial court granted Contestees' Motion to
Dismiss on Count II, holding that the "Contestants are not entitled to the equitable
relief sought in the context of an election contest as a matter of law."' 3
The Contestants appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. The New Mexico
Court of Appeals found that jurisdiction was proper in the New Mexico Supreme
Court and transferred the appeal on its own motion. 4

8. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 4, 31 P.3d at 1010.
9. The Contestees were Fernando Macias, Gilbert Apodaca, and Rita Torres.
10. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 7,31 P.3d at 1011. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1991) ("[A]ny civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.").
11.The names of the sixty-six voters had been entered into evidence, but since their ballots had been comingled, there was no way to show how their votes had been cast. Id. 13, 31 P.3d at 1010. In addition, the trial court
held that N.M. R. EvID. 11-507 provides that to overcome the privilege against a voter disclosing how they voted,
the contestant has to show that the voter cast the vote illegally. Minute Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss at 7, Gunaji (No. 25,896).
12. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 7, 31 P.3d at 1011.
13. Id. (internal quote omitted).
14. Order of Transfer, Gunaji v. Macias (No. 19,775). See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-5 (Michie 2002)
("Contest of election; appeal. An appeal shall lie from any judgment or decree entered in the contest proceeding to
the supreme court of New Mexico within the time and in the manner provided by law for civil appeals from the
district court.").
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Ill. BACKGROUND
A. Election Code
Article Seven, Section One, of the New Mexico Constitution provides that "the
legislature shall enact such laws as will secure the secrecy of the ballot, purity of
elections and guard against the abuse of the elective franchise."' 5 The New Mexico
Legislature adopted the essence of the current Election Code in 1969.16 The purpose
of the Election Code is to "secure the secrecy of the ballot, (ensure] the purity of
elections," and prevent abuse of the election system in an efficient manner. 7 Nearly
all elections are covered by the Code, including primary and general elections. 8 The
county clerk is designated to care for, and keep custody of, all voting systems, which
includes preparing and supplying the ballots used in elections. 9 The precinct board
member who is attending the voting machine is responsible for inspecting the face
of the machine after each vote to ensure that the ballot is in its proper place."0
The statute allows an unsuccessful candidate to contest an election.2' The
contestant may file a complaint in the district court of the county where either party
resides.2 The complaint must be filed within thirty days from the issuance of
certification of the election.23 The district court will render judgment in favor of the
party for whom a majority of legal votes has been found to be cast.24 The losing
party may appeal the judgment of the district court to the New Mexico Supreme
Court within the time and manner provided by law for civil appeals from the district
court.2 5

In an election contest, the contestant must make a prima facie showing that the
precinct board did not comply with the Election Code.26 Once a prima facie showing
has been made, the "candidates of the political party having majority representation
on the precinct board' 27 have the burden of proving there was no "fraud, intimidation, coercion or undue influence" 8 by the precinct board and showing the secrecy

15. N.M. CONST. art.
7, § 1.
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-1 (Michie 2002).
17. Id. § 1-1-1.1.
18. Id. § 1-1-19.

19. Id. §§ 1-9-12, 1-10-2.
20. Id. § 1-12-24. In Gunaji, the court noted that there was a gap in the statutory scheme because the Election
Code did not specifically address the issue in the case. 2001-NMSC-028, 15, 31 P.3d at 1012. While section 1-1224 requires the precinct board member to make sure the ballot is placed correctly, nothing in the Code spoke directly
to the duty of the precinct board or procedure to follow if an incorrect ballot is discovered. Id. The New Mexico
Legislature, in the 2002 session, passed a statutory provision that outlines a procedure and remedy for the use of
incorrect ballots. See infra part III.B.
21.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-1.

22. Id.§ 1-14-3.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 1-14-4.
25. Id. § 1-14-5.

26. Id. § 1-14-13. Note that later revisions to the Code, in response to Gunaji, do not change these particular
provisions. Cf.infra part I.B.
27.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-1.

28. Id.
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and purity of the election was preserved.29 If this burden is not met, the district court
should reject the votes of the entire precinct.30 Thus, at the time this case was
decided, the only form of relief available through the Code was to determine a
winner based on the legal votes cast in the contested election. If it were not possible
to determine all the legal votes, the court would reject all of the votes from the
contested precinct.
B. Legislative Response to Gunaji v. Macias
After this decision, the New Mexico State Legislature addressed the gap
identified by the New Mexico Supreme Court. The legislature adopted a new
provision of the Code that provides a procedure to follow when an incorrect ballot
is used in an election. 3 The statutory provision defines an incorrect ballot as a ballot
that fails to list the correct candidate for office.32 The statute provides that if eligible
voters have already voted using the incorrect ballot, the precinct board shall
immediately lock and seal the voting machine, preserve a record of who voted on
the machine, and notify the county clerk and the secretary of state by one hour after
the polls close.33 If a candidate contests the election and the incorrect votes are great
enough to affect the outcome of the election, the34court may order new ballots sent
to those voters who voted on the incorrect ballot.
While the legislature addressed the specific facts of Gunaji,the opinion remains
relevant as an indication of how the court may treat future disputes that are not
covered by statute. As Justice Maes stated, "Courts must often fill in gaps in
statutory schemes in order to achieve just results."35 Further, whereas elected
officials may address foreseeable circumstances prospectively through legislation,
the courts are more often faced with unforeseen situations that must be reactively
addressed. Therefore, courts must often employ the common law to fill in the
statutory gaps. The court's decision in Gunajidemonstrates a willingness to respond
to legislative gaps and, moreover, may have opened the door to bringing a new
constitutional cause of action.
C. New Mexico Election Contests
New Mexico courts have taken great strides to ensure that the will of the majority
of the electorate will determine the winner of an elective office.36 New Mexico case
law requires that all possible effort should be made to avoid disenfranchising
unchallenged voters.37 This includes giving any reasonable construction to a statute

29. Id. § 1-14-13. In Gunaji, the Contestant was a member of the same political party as the party having
majority representation on the precinct board. Gunaji,2001-NMSC-028, 2, 31 P.3d at 1010. Thus, the party would
have been in the untenable position of rebutting their own candidate's prima facie case.
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-13 (Michie 2002).
31. Id. § 1-12-37.
32. Id. § 1-12-37.1(A).

33. Id. § 1-12-37.1(B)-(C).
34. Id. § 1-12-37.1(E).
35. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028,

21, 31 P.3d at 1014.

36. See Kiehne v. Atwood, 93 N.M. 657, 664, 604 P.2d 123, 130 (N.M. 1979); Klumker v. Allred, 112 N.M.
42,47, 811 P.2d 75, 82 (N.M. 1991).
37. Martinez v. Harris, 102 N.M. 2, 690 P.2d 445 (N.M. 1984).
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so that a lawful vote may stand.38 In Orchardv. Board of Commissioners of Sierra
County,39 the court held that "[elven if the acts of [election] officers are fraudulent
the votes of the electors should not be invalidated if it is possible to prevent it. '' 40 In
4 the court
Valdez v. Herrera,
noted that "[w]e will examine most carefully, and
rather unsympathetically, any challenge to the right... of voters to participate in an
election before denying that right, absent bad faith, [or] fraud...., 42 The Valdez court
went on to say, "the voter shall not be deprived of his rights as an elector either by
fraud or the mistake of elections officers if it is possible to prevent it."'43 A court may
even consider circumstantial evidence to determine how a voter voted."4
The district court in this case was heavily influenced by Darr v. Village of
Tularosa,45 a New Mexico Court of Appeals decision issued while the Gunaji trial
was in progress. In Darr,the appellate court reversed the district court's order of a
new election and upheld the official results of the village council election. 46 Pursuant
to the Municipal Election Code,47 the district court rejected the votes due to voting
irregularities caused in part by the municipal clerk's breach of statutory duty, which
amounted to a failure to safeguard the purity of the ballot. 48 The appellate court held
that precinct votes may only be rejected if the contestant proves that, due to statutory
violations, it is impossible to determine a lawful winner. 49 The appellate court
interpreted the Municipal Election Code to read that a court must first attempt to
determine a legal winner before considering rejecting the votes.5" This initial burden
first falls on the contestant to prove that there is no possible way to determine lawful
votes. 5' In dicta, the appellate court stated that the district court may not necessarily
have the authority to order a new election, but the court declined to decide that issue,
basing its decision on other grounds.52

38. Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 485, 490, 153 P.2d 127, 132 (N.M. 1944).
39. 42 N.M. 172, 76 P.2d 41 (N.M. 1938).
40. Id. at 188, 76 P.2d at 51 (quoting 9 R.C.L. Elections § 102).
41. 48 N.M. 45, 145 P.2d 864 (N.M. 1944).
42. Id. at 49, 145 P.2d at 868.
43. Id. at 51, 145 P.2d at 870.
44. See Montoya v. Ortiz, 24 N.M. 616, 619, 175 P. 335, 338 (N.M. 1918).
45. 1998-NMCA-104, 962 P.2d 640.
46. Id. 121,962 P.2d at 646.
47. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-67 (Michie 2002).
48. Darr, 1998-NMCA-104,
6, 962 P.2d at 642. Section 3-8-67 of the Municipal Election Code is
substantially identical to section 1-14-13 of the State Election Code except that the provision includes the municipal
clerk in addition to the precinct board in its language. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-14-13, 3-8-67.
49. Darr, 1998-NMCA-104, 8,962 P.2d at 643.
50. Id.
51. Id. 1 20, 962 P.2d at 646. Examples cited by the court included voters who could not be served with
subpoenas or refused to testify how they voted and a contestant's inability to find circumstantial evidence to show
how the voters in question voted. Id.
52. Id. 11,962 P.2d at 643.
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D. Mootness
Gunaji was moot by the time it was decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court
because the terms of office had expired.53 As a general rule, the courts do not have
jurisdiction or the authority to issue judgment when no actual controversy exists.54
However, there are exceptions to this rule when the issues are of "substantial public
interest" and capable of repetition.55
Beginning with the first election contest in New Mexico in 1859, New Mexico's
highest court has liberally granted certiorari in moot election contests. The Supreme
Court of the Territory of New Mexico decided to review Arellano v. Chacon,56
despite the fact that the term of office had already expired, in order to provide
instruction and guidance in case the issue should rise again in the future. In Mowrer
v. Rusk,57 the court accepted the case even though legislation had been passed by the
state legislature that resolved the issue at controversy in the case, thus making it
moot. The court held that because the issue involved an inherent issue of separation
of powers, it presented "a recurring problem of great public interest. 58
However, in State v. Vogel,59 the court dismissed without prejudice because, due
to the expiration of office, there was no relief available to be granted. The court was
not persuaded by the contestant's argument that, although he could not be granted
the relief of returning to office, his reputation would be prejudiced if the decision
were to stand.6 °

E. Standing
The issue of standing is derived from the New Mexico Constitution 6' and the
Declaratory Judgment Act.62 While the New Mexico Supreme Court is not restrained
by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the court has frequently followed federal law
analysis of standing. 63 To assert third-party standing, the rule is generally that a third

53. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 9,31 P.3d at 1011. See N.M. CONST. art. IV,§ 4; art. X, § 2. The state senate
seat and the county commission seat were four-year terms of office.
54. Mowrer v. Rusk, 95 N.M. 48,51,618 P.2d 886, 889 (N.M. 1980) (citing the Declaratory Judgment Act,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-6-2 (1978), which requires an "actual controversy"). As previously noted, Contestant's Count
I sought a declaratory judgment.
55. Id.
56. 1859 WL 3122 (N.M. Terr. 1859).
57. 95 N.M. 48, 50, 618 P.2d 886, 888 (N.M. 1980).
58. Id. at 52, 618 P.2d at 890. See also Klumker v. Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 811 P.2d 75 (N.M. 1991) (holding
that the election contest was not moot even though the terms of office had expired because it involved a "recurring
question of public importance"); State v. Lujan, 85 N.M. 378, 512 P.2d 951 (N.M. 1973) ("[W]e decide the question
involved for two reasons: (I) it seems to possess sufficient public importance to warrant a decision and (2) it is
likely to recur.").
59. 39 N.M. 122, 123,41 P.2d 1107, 1108 (N.M. 1935).
60. The contestant in Vogel was claiming a private interest that did not fit within the "great public interest"
exception.
supreme court, a court
61. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § I ("[Tihe judicial power of the state shall be vested in...a
of appeals, district courts...."); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 13 ("The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters and causes not excepted in the constitution.").
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-6-2 (Michie 2002) ("In cases of actual controversy, district courts within their
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal relations...."). Cf.U.S. CONST. art.
I,§ 2 (limiting judicial power to "cases" and "controversies").
63. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, IN 12-13, 975 P.2d 841, 847 (looking to
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
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party must show a direct injury, the extent of which may be slight. 64 In addition,
New Mexico courts look to prudential considerations to further determine if parties
may assert the rights of others, such as whether the party has a close relation to the
third party and whether it would be difficult for the third party to assert its rights on
its own.65 When an organization seeks to assert the rights of its members, the
interests the group is seeking to protect must be germane to the organization's
purposes.66 State legislators have been denied standing to sue because the court
found that they showed only an "abstract right owed to the people of the state as a
whole, ' 67 which was not sufficient to claim a direct injury.
Further, the court did not grant standing under the "great public importance
doctrine" 68 because the case did not involve "[i]ssues of such constitutional
moment."69 A protection and advocacy group was also denied third-party standing
to keep a man on life support because there was a governing statute that did not
authorize the group to bring a suit.7"
The New Mexico Court of Appeals granted third-party standing to news
organizations that sought disclosure of depositions that were under protective
order.7 The court found that the plaintiffs had shown a direct injury, a causal
relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and a likelihood that the
injury would be redressed by a favorable decision.72 Other prudential considerations
also favored granting standing: the case did not meddle in the affairs of the political
branches, the news media interest in challenging the order suggested a public
interest in the contents of the order, the media sought to vindicate the public welfare,
and the media would challenge the protective order with the necessary "adversarial
vigor" to sharpen the presentation of issues.73
The New Mexico Supreme Court has granted third-party standing to plaintiffs
including individual doctors and non-profit organizations that provide abortion
services, counseling, and advocacy.74 The court found that a New Mexico
Department of Health rule prohibiting state funding for medically necessary
abortions violated the Equal Rights Amendment of the New Mexico Constitution.75

412 U.S. 669 (1973)); John Does I through M v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, Inc.,
1996-NMCA-094, 17, 924 P.2d 273, 278 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)); De Vargas
Say. & Loan Ass'n of Santa Fe v. Campbell, 87 N.M. 469, 471, 535 P.2d 1320, 1322 (N.M. 1975) (citing Data
Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
64. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL, 1999-NMSC-005,
12, 975 P.2d at 847.
65. Id. 13, 975 P.2d at 847 (citing John Does I through III, 1996-NMCA-094, 1 25, 924 P.2d at 279).
66. Forest Guardians v. Powell, 2001-NMCA-028, 1 21, 24 P.3d 803, 811 (citing Hunt v. Wash. Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)) (noting that an organization can bring suit on behalf of members when

(I) the members could sue in their own right, (2)the interests it seeks to protect are germane to purpose, and (3) the
claim or relief requires the participation of the members).
67. State ex rel. Coil v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-036, 9117, 990 P.2d 1277, 1282.
68. Id. 122, 990 P.2d at 1284.
69. Id.
70. Prot. & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 1999-NMCA-122, 9126, 989 P.2d 890,
896.
094,

71. John Does I through Ill v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, Inc., 1996-NMCA38, 924 P.2d 273, 282.

72. Id. 1 28, 924 P.2d at 280.
73. Id. 35-37, 924 P.2d at 281.
74. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, 9 2, 975 P.2d 841, 845.

75. Id.
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The court found that all the plaintiffs had a direct injury (financial interest) and a
sufficiently close and direct relationship to the third party (Medicaid eligible
women), and that privacy concerns and time constraints imposed a considerable
restraint on the women's ability to independently protect their own interests.76
F. Fashioninga Remedy Outside of the Statute
The right to contest an election has traditionally been statutory.77 Courts, until
Gunaji, generally restricted themselves to the procedural framework, as directed by
the legislature.78 Because election contests were considered statutory proceedings,
New Mexico courts have strictly followed election contest statutes.79
Both state and federal courts in other jurisdictions have provided several remedial
options in election contests, including overturning the results of the election and
installing a new winner, voiding the entire election and holding a new election,
filling the position by appointment, and imposing criminal or civil liability on
election officers."0 Generally, because of the effect on the rights of voters, courts do
not want to install a new winner unless the contestant can prove he or she received
the majority of votes in an election.8 '
G. "Free and Open" Clause
Article Two, Section Eight, of the New Mexico Constitution states that "[a]ll
elections shall be free and open." In addition to the statutory election contest action
in Gunaji, the Contestants claimed a constitutional violation of Article Two, Section
Eight. Until Gunaji, the New Mexico appellate courts had not interpreted this
section of the constitution. 2
The court found four other states with the same constitutional provision but found
no helpful interpretations in those states' case law. 3 The court found a similar clause
of "free and equal" in thirteen other states' constitutions with useful case law
speaking to those clauses.' Of the thirteen states, the court stated that Kentucky had
the most developed case law interpreting the constitutional provision. 5
The Kentucky courts have found many instances where there was a violation of
the "free and equal" clause. In one case, the ballot was incorrectly printed in three
of five precincts.8 6 Another case involved a ballot that listed the wrong candidates.87
Yet another case concerned a candidate who was omitted from the ballot by the

76. Id. 14, 975 P.2d at 847.
77. See Eturiagga v. Valdez, 109 N.M. 205, 208, 784 P.2d 24, 27 (N.M. 1989); Dinwiddie v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 103 N.M. 442,445,708 P.2d 1043, 1046 (N.M. 1985); Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 385, 362
P.2d 771, 774 (N.M. 1961).
78. Eturiagga, 109 N.M. at 208, 784 P.2d at 27 (citing Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307,
551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976)).

79. id.
80. Developments in the Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 1298 (1975).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1315.
Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028,
Id.
Id.
Id.

86.
87.

Lakes v. Estridge, 172 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1943).
Hillard ,. Lakes, 172 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1943).

27, 31 P.3d at 1015.
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county clerk.88 In addition, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has held that it was not
necessary to show fraud or other wrongdoing to prove a violation of the constitutional clause.89 Similar to New Mexico statutes at the time of Gunaji, Kentucky
statutes made it necessary to show fraud, intimidation, bribery, or violence. 90 In one
case, a voting machine had malfunctioned and the Kentucky court found "constructive fraud" in order to stay within the statute, arising from a breach of a legal duty
that the "law would pronounce fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others,
to violate confidence, or to injure public interests."'
In Johnson v. May,92 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that an election is not
free and equal if "a substantial number or percentage of qualified electors are
deprived of their right to vote." 93 The court showed deference to the election process
by stating that the court's only job is to determine whether there was substantial
compliance with the law in an election; if not, the court should send the question
back to the people so that the courts do not decide the outcome of an election.94 The
court also noted that regardless of whether the statute is insufficient or whether there
was fraud, mistake, or other wrongdoing, the constitutional provision is
mandatory.9
Through the reliance on the reasoning of the Kentucky courts, the New Mexico
Supreme Court demonstrated an apparent willingness to follow Kentucky's lead. A
malfunctioning voting machine, for example, might now rise to the level of
"constructive fraud" in New Mexico. More importantly, election errors in New
Mexico can now amount to state constitutional violations.
IV. RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS
The court had two basic jurisdictional questions to determine before it could
address the constitutional issue. First, the court had to determine whether it would
hear the case in spite of the fact that it was moot, and second, whether the candidates
had standing to represent the voters in Precinct 3 1.
A. Mootness
The court first addressed the question of mootness. By the time the case had come
to the New Mexico Supreme Court, the terms of office for state senate and county
commission had expired. This meant there was no actual controversy left to decide
and direct relief could not be granted. The court, however, decided, because the
issues presented were of substantial public interest and capable of repetition, yet
evading review, that it would review the moot case.96

88. Ferguson v. Rohde, 449 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1970).
89. Id. at 761.
90. Wood v. Kirby, 566 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. 1978) (referencing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.165(4)
(Michie 1978)).
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 755.
203 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1947).
Id. at 39.
Id.

95. Id.
96. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028,

10, 31 P.3d at 1011.
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The court found that the Contestants' state constitutional claim raised an issue of
substantial public interest.97 The particular issues of substantial public interest
articulated by the court were first, whether the Election Code was the exclusive
means to contest an election, and secondly, what the proper remedy is when the
election error could have potentially affected the outcome of the election.
The court also found that the issues in this case were capable of repetition.98 The
Contestees had argued that because the specific election between the candidates who
were parties in this case was not going to happen in the future, they would also be
unlikely to litigate these issues ever again. 99 However, the court responded that there
was no requirement under the New Mexico mootness doctrine that the repetition
must be between the same parties." ° The court reasoned that the specific parties to
a suit were irrelevant and that the crucial part is that the issue could be raised in a
future lawsuit. The court found that the issues were capable of repetition because
human error could not be eliminated from the election process, and, thus, an
incorrect ballot face could be the basis for an election contest in the future.' °' The
court also indicated that it was important to decide the issues at that time because
the problem of mootness could occur again in future election contests because of
expiring terms of office.
The legislature has since addressed the facts of this case, so the court will not be
faced with filling in the specific statutory gap in the future. With that said, given the
court's long history of liberally granting certiorari in election contests, it is not a
surprise the court reviewed this case despite its mootness. This is especially true
because this case raised novel and important issues. Moreover, the court may have
been alluding to a more general sense of "election error" as opposed to the specific
errors in this case. Thus, this case presented a vehicle for the court to examine how
it should address future election errors, particularly when there is a gap in the
statutory scheme.
B. Standing
Gunaji was the first time the court had expressly decided whether a candidate has
standing to assert the constitutional claim that there was a violation of the free and
open election clause. The Contestants asserted that the sixty-six voters who voted
on the incorrect ballot were denied their basic right to vote for the lawful candidates
of their choice.' °2 The Contestants also argued that the candidates had a right to be
on the ballot and, therefore, their rights were violated as well.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. In briefing, the Contestees-Appellees had argued that Senator Macias was retiring and would not be
running for the seat again. Appellees' Supplemental Memorandum at 3, Gunaji (No. 25,896).
100. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 9[11, 31 P.3d at loll.
101. Of course, if this issue were raised before a court now, the Election Code would cover the circumstances
that led to this contest. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-37 (Michie 2002).
102. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 1 18, 31 P.3d at 1013.
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Past election contest cases had only indirectly referenced the rights of candidates
but not within an Article Two, Section Eight context. 0 3 The court consequently
looked to other states with similar constitutional provisions.
The court found other states were divided on the issue of candidates asserting
voter rights." The court cited several cases involving whether a "write-in"
candidate should be allowed on the ballot. In Kasten v. Guth, °5 the Supreme Court
of Missouri held that an elector is not required to vote for the names printed on the
ballot but may instead write in the candidate of her choice. In turn, the Missouri
court noted that a candidate is entitled to be on the ballot for the benefit of voters
who want to support that candidate."° The Supreme Court of Utah, however, has
held that a candidate does not have a right to appear on the ballot. 107 The Gunaji
court agreed with those states that hold that candidates do not have the right to bring
this constitutional claim "in the name of the right to vote."'0 8
While the court dismissed any right of the candidate to be voted for under Article
Two, Section Eight, it was left to decide whether a candidate had standing to assert
the rights of voters. New Mexico case law also provided little guidance to the court
on third-party standing for an Article Two, Section Eight claim.0 9 The court turned
to the U.S. Supreme Court for guidance.
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that the candidates met the standing
requirements outlined in United States v. Raines:" ° when a party seeks to assert the
constitutional rights of a third party, the litigant must show an injury in fact and
prudential considerations support advancing the claim. The court recognized two
prudential considerations: "constitutional rights should not be litigated unnecessarily, and.. .the third party may not be able to advocate the right as effectively as its
actual holder."'
The court found the Contestants' injury in fact was the loss of emoluments of
office. 1 2 The court stated that constitutional rights were not being litigated
unnecessarily and that the Contestants were working in favor of upholding voters'

103. See State ex rel. Read v. Christ, 25 N.M. 175, 199, 179 P. 629, 637 (N.M. 1919) (stating, "nor should
the successful candidate suffer").
104. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 19, 31 P.3d at 1013 (citing Kasten v. Guth, 375 S.W.2d 110, 114 (Mo.
1964); Preisler v. City of St. Louis, 322 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Mo. 1959); Anderson v. Cook, 130 P.2d 278, 285 (Utah
1942)).
105. 375 S.W.2d 110, 114 (Mo. 1964).
106. Id. at 115 (citing 29 C.J.S. Elections § 180 (1964)). The Gunaji court also cited Preisler,322 S.W.2d
at 753 (holding that the Missouri constitutional provision gives "every eligible person.. .the right...to become a
candidate"). Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 19, 31 P.3d at 1013.
107. Anderson, 130 P.2d at 285.
108. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 19, 31 P.3d at 1013 (internal quote omitted).
109. The court referenced Valdez v. Herrera,48 N.M. 45, 47, 145 P.2d 864, 870 (N.M. 1944), and State ex
rel. Read v. Christ,25 N.M. 175, 199, 179 P. 629, 637 (1919), both election contest cases, for the proposition that
voters should not be lightly deprived of their rights due to the mistakes of election officers. Gunaji, 2001 -NMSC028, 18, 31 P.3d at 1013.
110. 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (stating that the standing rule is not required by the U.S. Constitution but is
instead a "weighty" rule of practice).
111. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 20, 31 P.3d at 1014 (quoting Lewis v. Iowa Dist. Court, 555 N.W.2d 216,
219 (Iowa 1996)).
112. Id.
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rights. 3 In addition, the court
found that it was not as feasible for voters to organize
4
into a body of plaintiffs."
At first blush, it may appear unusual that the court decided to reach both the
issues of mootness and standing. However, it was necessary to determine both issues
because of the constitutional question. If the election contest was strictly a statutory
claim, the court would only have had to address the mootness issue. In fact, the issue
of standing was not addressed by the parties or the lower court at any stage of the
litigation and was apparently raised sua sponte by the court." 5
The Gunaji opinion, however, did little to clarify New Mexico law on standing. 116
Although the opinion does not cite previously followed federal case law, the court's
review of United States v. Raines is relevant because the case involves voter
registration. However, the opinion does not attempt to reconcile the latest New
Mexico or federal case law on standing. While this may seem a small point, New
Mexico case law has been far from clear on standing, and this opinion now adds to
the mix of sources and variations of the rule.
More important is how the court's decision on standing relates to the constitutional claim and the election contest. As stated previously, the legislature has
addressed the specific facts of this case, which means the New Mexico Supreme
Court would not have to search for its own remedy if a similar case were before it
today. Yet, since it granted standing to candidates who assert the rights of voters
under the New Mexico Constitution, it is possible for an entirely separate claim to
be brought without the statutory election contest. And, since the court also decided
that it may look outside the Election Code to provide a remedy when not addressed
on the statute, the court may decide to do so in the future with a similar constitutional claim.
C. Remedy Outside of the Election Code
The court found that the statutory section relied on by the Contestants did not
apply to the facts in this case. The Election Code provides that if the precinct board
is not able to show that it upheld the purity and sanctity of the election and that there
was no fraud, the votes from that precinct are to be rejected.' The New Mexico
Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's finding that the precinct board did not
comply with the Election Code even though there was no fraud " 8 Instead, the court
found that it was the county clerk, not the precinct board, who was responsible for

113. Id.
114. Id.

115. In fact, the court cited Alvarez v. State Taxation & Revenue Department, 1999-NMCA-006, 971 P.2d
1280, for the notion that standing may be raised sua sponte by the court.
116. The New Mexico Court of Appeals has indicated the lack of guidance and clarity in New Mexico's case
law on standing in John Does I through III v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, Inc., 1996-

NMCA-094, 1 27, 924 P.2d 273, 279. This was also raised by the New Mexico Supreme Court many years ago in
De Vargas Savings & Loan Ass'n of Santa Fe v. Campbell, 87 N.M. 469,471, 535 P.2d 1320, 1322 (N.M. 1975)
(quoting State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 363, 524 P.2d 975, 979 (N.M. 1974) ("'[T]he entire
question of standing in New Mexico is somewhat in a state of confusion, and it is impossible to reconcile in
principle the many decisions of this Court upon this question."').
117.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-13 (Michie 2002).

118. Gunaji,2001-NMSC-028,

16, 31 P.3d at 1012.
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the errors. 1'9 However, the Election Code did not hold the county clerk responsible
for this situation. 12 Since the court found the Code inapplicable, the court examined
whether they had the power to fashion a remedy outside of the Code.
The court stated that the common law rule applied in election contests is to first
determine who received the plurality of votes in the election. 2' Once this is
determined, the test is to subtract the number of invalid votes from the winner's total
and add this number of votes to123the loser's total. 122 If the outcome is affected, the
court may order a new election.
Contestants claimed that this remedy could be implied in Article Two, Section
Eight.' 24 Contestees, however, argued that the Election Code provided the exclusive
remedy in an election contest and, since an election contest was a statutorily created
cause of action, the court did not have the power to go outside of the statute. The
court interpreted prior New Mexico case law, however, to show that courts must
follow the specific procedures outlined in the Code and the grounds and remedies
were not exclusive to the Code. Therefore, the court could fill in the gap and find
a remedy outside of the statute. In addition, the court stated that "[c]ommon sense
suggests that the grounds for an election challenge need not be found in the Code,
25
such as the protection of the basic right to vote for the candidate of one's choice."
The court, however, rejected the Contestants' request for a new election. The
court found several impractical and unrealistic reasons for granting such a remedy.
To hold a second election would not capture the will of the electorate at the time of
the first election. Holding another election would mean additional costs and there
would be no guarantee that a new election would be free of irregularities, mistakes,
or even fraud. The court was persuaded that factors of "election economy, relative
certitude of result, and fairness to the candidates" precluded ordering a new
election.' 2 6
The court instead analogized to the Election Code for a remedy.'27 The Code, at
the time, provided that when there was noncompliance with the statute, the votes of
the entire precinct should be rejected. 128 Finding that there is great value in keeping
with the legislative intent and policy of the statute and the fact that courts often look
to statutes to provide common law principles, the court rejected the votes in Precinct
31.129

The threshold question of determining who received the majority of votes was not
possible to answer in this case because the invalid ballots had been mixed with valid
ballots. In fact, the Contestants claimed the violation made it impossible to
determine an accurate count of votes. The appellate court in Darr v. Village of
119. Id. [15, 31 P.3d at 1012.

120. Id. 1 17, 31 P.3d at 1013. Again, section 1-12-37.1 now makes the precinct board responsible for an
incorrect ballot.
121. Id. 30, 31 P.3d at 1016.
122. Id. 16, 31 P.3d at 1013.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. 26, 31 P.3dat 1015.
126. Id. 132, 31 P.3d at 1016.
127.

Id.

33, 31 P.3d at 1017.

128. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-13 (Michie 2002).
129. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 35, 31 P.3d at 1017.
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3 ° held that
Tularosa"
the votes in a precinct could only be rejected if the contestant
proves that the statutory violations made it impossible to determine a lawful winner.
The Gunaji decision extends this rule to constitutional violations, as well.
The opinion noted that the "traditional" remedy, when there was no applicable
statute, was to grant a new election. 3 ' However, the court did not cite to New
Mexico case law on point. A review of most New Mexico election contests either
does not state the relief or does not show that courts have granted a new election as
relief.
Granting a new election as a remedy is, in some sense, about who decides
elections. The Gunaji court was persuaded that the will of the electorate at the time
of the first election would not be truly captured by ordering a new election. Perhaps
answering the dicta in Darr(raising the question whether a court has the power to
order a new election), the opinion states that it is possible to order a new election,
if there is no applicable statute, but finds such factors as election economy and
fairness to candidates to outweigh holding a new election.132
Kentucky case law espouses a different view:

Unless judgments of courts and boards are to be substituted for elections, the
trial of a question like this is confined to determining whether there has been a
substantial compliance with the law in the conduct of the election, and, if there
has not been, to remand the question to the people concerned, where their will
may be fairly and legally recorded. 33
It is fair reasoning that, while courts have a constitutional duty to protect
34
candidates' and voters' rights, courts should not displace the will of the electorate. '
New Mexico courts, as illustrated in the history of election contests, have vigorously
protected the voter. But if a court has invalidated an election, then it is reasonable
to argue that the court should order a new election so it does not judge who is the
winner.135 However, that would also mean invalidating the votes from the first
election and replacing the will of the original electorate with that of the later
election.
The court ultimately took a conservative approach in determining its own relief
outside of the statute by analogizing to the Election Code. Yet, in the end, the voters
of Precinct 31 were denied their right to have their votes counted. The court was
both constrained and free to make a choice of remedy so long after the election and
after the terms of office had expired. The court could not practically order a new
election and had sound justification for not providing that remedy, in any case. At
the same time, the court, free of any statutory obligation, could have found creative
remedies such as censuring the county clerk in its opinion or even imposing some
civil penalty. Directing the focus of the remedy towards those who the court found
at fault, and away from the innocent voters, might have better aligned with the
130. 1998-NMCA-104, 962 P.2d 640.
131. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 30, 31 P.3d at 1016.
132. Id. 132, 31 P.3d at 1016.
133. Johnson v. May, 203 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1947).
134. Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The ConstitutionalityofBush v. Gore, 82 B.U.L. REV.
609, 640 (2002).
135. Id.
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notions underlying the "free and open" clause and New Mexico's election contest
jurisprudence.
In fairness, by analogizing to the Code, the court showed deference
to the
politically accountable branch of government and the principles of separation
of
powers. The effects of the discarded votes cannot sit only on the shoulders
of the
court. The legislature also has a responsibility to ensure that every eligible
voter has
the right to vote.
The legislature has, to its credit, addressed the facts of this case and provided
a
just remedy. The statutory provision passed as a result of this case provides
that
[i]f a candidate contests the election results and the court finds that the number
of eligible voters who relied on incorrect ballots is great enough to affect the
outcome of the candidate's race, the court may order the county clerk to send
ballots for that candidate's race to those voters who voted using an incorrect
ballot.

13 6

Thus, if the particular issue is raised again, the court would not only be able
to find
a breach of duty by the precinct board but would also have an express
remedy to
rely on. This remedy is a better answer to the sanctity of elections and the
right to
vote because it ensures that each vote will count.
There are also remedies that should be explored by the legislature to
address
future election errors. Although it may not be possible in every situation,
one
solution might be to have an impartial tribunal specially designated
to resolve
election error or disputes before or during the election.' 37 The legislature
should
explore these options because most post-election contests--even with the
expedited
procedures provided in the Code---do not reach their natural conclusion
until long
after the election is held. More often than not, as in this case, the terms
of office
expire. On the other hand, the nature of election contests in a litigation setting
do not
always afford expedient resolution. A significant amount of the delays
in this case
were caused by the parties themselves. Further, when the courts must grapple
with
filling in the gaps of the statutory scheme, a quick decision may not be forthcoming.
D. Free and Open Elections
Facing a matter of first impression, the court examined other states with
the same
or a similar constitutional provision. The court stated that Kentucky had
the most
developed jurisprudence of any state interpreting the "free and equal" clause
in the
Kentucky State Constitution.'3 8 The court, after reviewing relevant Kentucky
case
law, was persuaded that an election is only "free and equal" when the
voter is
allowed to choose between the lawful candidates on a ballot.'39 The sixty-six
voters
in Precinct 31 were, therefore, not able to choose between the lawful candidates
in
that election and accordingly the court held there was a constitutional violation.
0

136.
137.
138.
139.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-37.1(E) (Michie 2002).
Developments in the Law: Elections, supra note 80, at 1298-99.
Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 1 28, 31 P.3d at 1016.
Id. 129, 31 P.3d at 1016.

140. Id.
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V. IMPLICATIONS
The court's holding may open the door for candidates to bring an independent or
separate constitutional claim. Election contests have been traditionally statutory
causes of action. "It is commonly said that there is no general state jurisdiction over
election contests at all; that such jurisdiction must be given by statute."' 4' In State
ex rel. Denton v. Vinyard,'42 the court stated, "the right of contest and the jurisdiction to entertain it must be found in the statute law."'' 43 To this, the Gunaji court
responded, "Our cases indicate that it is the procedure in an election contest which
is exclusive, not the grounds and the remedy."' 44 With Gunaji, the New Mexico
Supreme Court recognized a claim under the free and open clause as valid grounds
to contest an election.
The court may also be signaling that when there is an interference with the right
to vote, the Election Code can be too narrow. With the exception of the reforms
enacted after Gunaji, the Election Code requires a showing that there was fraud,
undue influence, or coercion. A constitutional claim would not require any
intentional wrongdoing, as in this case, where it was mistake. The constitutional
claim would allow for much broader claims for any error that may occur in an
election that would interfere with the right of a voter to choose between the lawful
candidates.
The Kentucky courts, which guided the New Mexico Supreme Court with the
constitutional question, have interpreted their election statute broadly to bring a
claim within the statute, as in Wood v. Kirby where the court found "constructive
fraud.' 45 At the same time, the Kentucky courts have treated the constitutional
claim as separate from the statutory claim, but it is not clear whether
46 the constitutional claim is allowed independently without the statutory claim. 1
If New Mexico courts allowed the claim to be brought independently, candidates
might find bringing a constitutional claim more attractive than the statutory cause
of action because of the lesser burden of proof and lack of required statutory
process. It is not clear whether a court would allow an independent claim separate
from the statutory cause of action, but it is possible, given the court's ruling on
standing and fashioning a remedy outside of the statute.
The Gunajicourt also held that it may find a remedy outside of the Code. While
the remedial possibilities to the court were endless, the court showed constraint by
choosing to analogize to the Election Code. The court also may have foreclosed the
possibility of ordering a new election in future election contests. The court showed
a preference toward staying as close to the remedies provided by statute as possible.
The court's deference to the legislature was a wise course of action because it

141. Weinberg, supra note 134, at 648-49.
142. 55 N.M. 205, 230 P.2d 238 (N.M. 1951).
143. Id. at 208, 230 P.2d at 239.
144. Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 26, 31 P.3d at 1015.
145. 566 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Ky. 1978).
146. Both Wallbrecht v. Ingram, 175 S.W. 1022 (Ky. 1915), and Johnson v. May, 203 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1947),
analyzed the constitutional claim separately, and it is clear that the contestants made the claims separately. However,
the courts first looked to any applicable statutory provision to determine whether there was a violation. Wallbrecht,
175 S.W. at 1025-27; Johnson, 203 S.W.2d at 38-40.
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permitted election matters to remain primarily governed by the representative branch
of government.
For future election contestants and lower courts, this means every effort should
be made to allow the Election Code to govern the contest. If a future election error
occurs that is not covered by the Code, however, it may be possible to test the
bounds of this decision by bringing an independent constitutional claim and
requesting an appropriate common law remedy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, held that an
election contest, although moot because the terms of office had expired, could still
be heard because it raised issues of substantial public interest and was capable of
repetition. Second, the court held that a candidate may assert the constitutional rights
of voters. Third, the court held that, because the Election Code was not applicable
to the particular case, the court had the power to fashion a remedy outside of the
statute; only the procedure for contesting an election was exclusive, not the grounds
or the remedies. Fourth, the court found there was a violation of the free and open
clause of the New Mexico Constitution. The court chose to analogize to the Election
Code in deciding on a remedy and to reject the votes of the precinct where the
election irregularities took place instead of holding a new election. This did not
affect the outcome of the election.
This opinion creates the possibility of a separate, and perhaps independent, cause
of action for candidates to contest elections free from the burden of proof required
by the Election Code. Although the court stated that the statute provided the
exclusive procedure to be followed, it also stated that the court could find grounds
and remedies outside of the statute. Through this opinion, the court has expressed
an openness to address election issues that are not covered by statute and at the same
time has shown deference to the legislature and separation of powers by analogizing
to the statute to find a remedy.

